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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Pursuant to this Court’s invitation, the United States respectfully 
submits this brief as amicus curiae to address the questions posed by this 
Court.  In the view of the United States, the petition should be denied.   
The petition requests that this Court create a new rule that would 
make a category of unlawfully present aliens eligible to receive licenses to 
practice law in the State of Utah.  That category is apparently designed to 
correspond to persons who have received deferred action under the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA).  The federal 
government has taken steps to rescind DACA, and the policy continues in 
part only because of preliminary injunctions that are the subject of 
continuing litigation.  We respectfully suggest that an exercise of 
administrative enforcement discretion that the government is seeking to 
rescind does not form a prudent basis for creating a new rule for the 
privilege of bar membership.   
If this Court agrees that rulemaking would not be prudent at this 
time, it need not resolve questions regarding the Court’s authority to 
establish a rule that would allow certain unlawfully present aliens to 
receive law licenses.  If this Court were to reach those questions, however, 
2 
 
it should conclude that it lacks that authority.  Acting in the area of 
immigration, where it has broad and exclusive authority, Congress 
determined that unlawfully present aliens should generally be ineligible 
for public benefits, including professional licenses.  Congress permitted 
States to create an exception to the prohibition on receipt of public benefits, 
but only “through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, 
which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).  The 
text and context of the provision make clear that Congress intended to 
require States to use their legislative processes, leaving the authority to 
override Congress’s default rule to politically accountable actors at the 
state level.   
Congress’s conclusion that aliens should not receive benefits, subject 
to that narrow exception, does not implicate Tenth Amendment concerns.  
Congress determined that unlawfully present aliens should be ineligible 
for professional licenses.  Congress authorized States to override that 
determination, but it certainly was not required to do so.   And its 
determination to authorize States to supersede the default rule under 





A. Statutory and Constitutional Background 
1. Alien Eligibility for Public Benefits 
“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power 
over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”  Arizona v. United 
States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012); see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 4.  Congress 
exercised that authority in Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA” or “the Act”), Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, which deems certain categories of aliens 
ineligible to obtain various public benefits.   
The Act deems ineligible for federal benefits those aliens who are not 
“qualified aliens” within the meaning of the Act, with certain listed 
exceptions.  8 U.S.C. § 1611.  Similarly, the Act makes certain categories of 
aliens ineligible for state and local benefits.  Aliens are not “eligible for any 
State or local public benefit” unless they are “qualified alien[s]” (as defined 
in 8 U.S.C. § 1641); nonimmigrant aliens (a term defined in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)); or aliens who are “paroled” into the United States (under 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)) for less than one year.  8 U.S.C. § 1621(a).  The term 
“public benefit” includes “any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or 
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commercial license provided by an agency of a State or local government 
or by appropriated funds of a State or local government.”  Id. § 1621(c).  
Petitioners here have not disputed that a law license issued by this Court 
qualifies as a public benefit. 
Congress authorized States to override the general statutory 
prohibition and make additional aliens eligible for state or local public 
benefits, but only “through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 
1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). 
2. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
The Secretary of Homeland Security may exercise discretion to 
forbear from removing an alien for a designated period, a practice known 
as “deferred action.”  See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 
525 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999) (AADC); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (describing 
“deferred action” as “an act of administrative convenience to the 
government which gives some cases lower priority”). 
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security announced the policy 
known as DACA, which makes deferred action available to “certain young 
people who were brought to this country as children.”  Pet. Ex. B, at 1 
(DACA Memorandum).  Following successful completion of a background 
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check and review, an alien who met certain age, residence, and other 
guidelines could receive deferred action for a period of two years, subject 
to renewal.  Id. at 1-3.  The DACA Memorandum stated that it “confer[red] 
no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship.  Only 
the Congress, acting through its legislative authority, can confer these 
rights.”  Id. at 3. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has since determined 
that the DACA policy should be rescinded.  See Elaine C. Duke, Acting 
Secretary, DHS, Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) (Sept. 5, 2017) (“Duke Mem.”)1; Kirstjen M. Nielsen, 
Secretary, DHS, Memorandum Regarding Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) (June 22, 2018) (“Nielsen Mem.”) (declining to disturb 
                                                 
1 Elaine C. Duke, Memorandum of Rescission of Deferred Action for 




decision to rescind DACA).2  That determination has been preliminary 
enjoined, however, and remains the subject of pending litigation.3 
B. The Current Petition 
Petitioners are undocumented immigrants who graduated from Utah 
law schools and have been admitted to practice law in California.  See Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 6064(b) (authorizing California Supreme Court to 
admit bar applicants who are not lawfully present in the United States).  
Their petition asks the Court to issue a rule that would allow aliens who 
are unlawfully present in the United States to become members of the Utah 
bar as long as they (1) are otherwise qualified for admission; (2) were 
                                                 
2 Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Memorandum from Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen 
(June 22, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DACA.pdf 
3 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-
15068, 2018 WL 5833232 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2018) (affirming preliminary 
injunction against DACA rescission), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 5, 
2018) (No. 18-587); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 431 
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (preliminary injunction against DACA rescission), appeal 
pending, No. 18-485 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 5, 2018) (No. 
18-589); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2018) (setting aside 
DACA rescission), reconsideration denied, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C.), 
appeals pending, Nos. 18-5243, 18-5245 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed (U.S. 
Nov. 5, 2018) (No. 18-588); Casa de Md. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 284 F. 
Supp. 3d 758 (Mar. 5, 2018), appeal pending, No. 18-1522 (4th Cir.). 
7 
 
brought to the United States as minors and continuously resided in the 
United States since that time; and (3) have received documented 
employment authorization from United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services.  Proposed Rule 14-721 (Ex. A to Petition).    
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court should decline to issue a rule premised on the 
DACA policy.    
The petition now before this Court asks the Court to create a new rule 
of eligibility for bar membership designed to correspond to the category 
of people who meet the guidelines for deferred action under the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals policy.  See, e.g., Pet. 17 (discussing 
population covered by DACA).  We respectfully urge that it would be 
anomalous to create a rule of eligibility based on an exercise of agency 
enforcement discretion that has been rescinded.  
Under DACA, certain aliens unlawfully present in the United States 
could receive deferred action for a period of two years, subject to renewal.  
In addition to the temporary relief from removal directly flowing from a 
grant of deferred action, certain collateral consequences flowed from pre-
existing laws and regulations, including the ability to obtain work 
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authorization in certain circumstances.  See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).  
In creating DACA, the Department of Homeland Security emphasized 
that its exercise of enforcement discretion “confer[red] no substantive 
right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship.  Only the Congress, 
acting through its legislative authority, can confer these rights.”  Pet. Ex. 
B, at 3.   
In 2017, DHS decided to wind down the DACA policy, concluding 
that it is not authorized by law and, in any event, not appropriate to 
continue.  See Duke Mem., supra n.1; Nielsen Mem., supra n.2.  The policy 
remains partially in effect only because of preliminary injunctions that are 
the subject of active litigation.  See supra n.3. 
It would not be prudent for the State of Utah to adopt a rule of 
eligibility based on the parameters of an exercise of enforcement discretion 
that DHS has concluded is unlawful and should, in any case, be 
abandoned.  At a minimum, it would not seem advisable to take such a 
step before the courts resolve the pending challenges to DACA’s rescission. 
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II. Section 1621 permissibly sets a default rule that can be 
overridden only by a legislative enactment.  
If the Court were to reach the question, it should conclude that States 
can override the otherwise applicable bar on the receipt of benefits only 
through the enactment of a law by the state legislature.  
A. Congress set a default rule that can be overridden only 
by a legislative enactment. 
“For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for 
regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors 
has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.”  
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).  Congress has exercised its authority 
to limit the eligibility of unlawfully present aliens for certain categories of 
benefits.  With limited exceptions, such aliens are ineligible for federal 
benefits.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1611.  Such aliens are also ineligible for certain 
categories of state benefits as well, including, as relevant here, professional 
licenses such as a license to practice law.  See id. § 1621.  There is no dispute 
here that Congress has authority to render unlawfully present aliens 
ineligible for law licenses, or that it has exercised that authority in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1621.  See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Question as to Whether 
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Undocumented Immigrants are Eligible for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So. 3d 
432, 434-35 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). 
Congress concluded that it would allow States to override the federal 
prohibition and provide otherwise-ineligible aliens with benefits, but only 
“through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which 
affirmatively provides for . . . eligibility” for a particular public benefit.  
8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). 
The text and context of this provision make clear that Congress 
contemplated a legislative enactment, rather than a rule issued by a court.  
Congress provided that States could override its eligibility determination 
only through a specified procedure: “enactment of a State law after August 
22, 1996.”  The phrase “enactment of a State law” naturally connotes a 
statute passed by the state legislature.  In ordinary parlance, the phrase 
“enactment of a . . . law” is not used to describe promulgation of a rule by a 
court or administrative agency; in fact, petitioners do not even use that 
phrase to describe what they are asking this Court to do, instead asking the 
Court “to adopt a rule opting out of the federal restriction against bar 
admission for undocumented immigrants.”  Pet. 12.   
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While in many circumstances, congressional references to state law 
can properly be understood to encompass any state provision with the 
force of law, Congress here was focused on the particular procedures a 
State could use to override federal law, and the federal statute is best 
understood to refer to enactment of a law by a state legislature.  See Florida 
Bd. of Bar Examiners, 134 So. 3d at 435.  The requirement that the enactment 
occur after August 22, 1996 (that is, after the federal law took effect), 
underscores that States may create an exception to the federal prohibition 
only by accepting political accountability for that step through enactment 
of legislation by a popularly elected legislature.  Confirming this view, the 
Conference Report stated that “[o]nly the affirmative enactment of a law by 
a State legislature and signed by the Governor after the date of enactment 
of this Act, that references this provision, will meet the requirements of this 
section.”  H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).   
The petition does not seriously contest that Congress intended to 
require an enactment of a state law by a legislature to overrule the federal 
default rule.  Instead, the petition argues that the Tenth Amendment limits 
Congress’s authority to require such a legislative enactment.  See Pet. 13-16.  
As discussed below, this argument is mistaken. 
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B. The Tenth Amendment does not prohibit Congress 
from conditioning States’ exercise of authority in the 
immigration area. 
The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. Const. amend. X.  
The Tenth Amendment has been construed to limit “the circumstances 
under which Congress may use the States as implements of regulation” or 
may “direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular field 
or a particular way.”  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).  
Thus, Congress may not “commandeer the legislative processes of the 
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program.”  Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018) 
(brackets and quotation marks omitted).  While “Congress may use its 
spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with 
federal policies,” “when pressure turns into compulsion, the legislation 
runs contrary to our system of federalism.”  National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577-78 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Unlike the federal statute in New York v. United States, § 1621 does not 
require a State to enact legislation.  Indeed, it does not require a State to do 
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anything.  Instead, § 1621 sets a default rule of ineligibility, but provides a 
means by which States can override that rule. 
Section 1621 was enacted as part of a broader scheme governing the 
ineligibility of certain categories of aliens for public benefits.  Through 
PRWORA, Congress announced a “national policy with respect to welfare 
and immigration.”  8 U.S.C. § 1601.  And it established “a comprehensive 
set of eligibility requirements governing aliens’ access to both federal and 
state benefits.”  Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 884 (9th Cir. 2014).   
With respect to state benefits, Congress directed that certain 
“qualified aliens” within the meaning of the Act, see 8 U.S.C. § 1641, “shall 
be eligible for any State public benefits,” id. § 1622(b), and that aliens 
generally are not “eligible for any State or local public benefit” unless they 
are a “qualified alien,” a nonimmigrant alien, or an alien paroled into the 
United States for less than one year, with certain listed exceptions, id. 
§ 1621(a), (b).  Congress also authorized States to make additional 
categories of aliens eligible for state or local public benefits “through the 
enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively 
provides for such eligibility.”  Id. § 1621(d). 
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Congress was under no obligation to accommodate state interests at 
all when establishing aliens’ eligibility for public benefits.  It is “ ‘a routine 
and normally legitimate part’ of the business of the Federal Government to 
classify on the basis of alien status, and to ‘take into account the character 
of the relationship between the alien and this country,’ ” and “only rarely 
are such matters relevant to legislation by a State.”  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 225 (1982) (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80, 85).   
Congress did, however, allow States to override the otherwise 
applicable prohibition in § 1621(d), but only when a state legislature 
concludes that it is appropriate to make state or local benefits available to 
particular aliens.  The grant of authority to the state legislatures in this area 
of traditional federal concern cannot plausibly be characterized as an 
interference with state government.  Rather than intruding on the States’ 
right to “remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere 
of authority,” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997), Congress has 
here accorded state interests an additional measure of respect by granting 
States the authority to regulate in this area, if they so choose, by enacting a 
law establishing the eligibility of additional aliens.  The Constitution does 
not compel Congress to allow States to take advantage of that 
15 
 
accommodation in ways that would not satisfy Congress’s desired 
condition of clear political accountability by a popularly elected body. 
The federal scheme at issue here is best analogized to that in Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981), where 
the Supreme Court held that Congress could permissibly create a 
regulatory scheme that would apply unless a State implemented its own 
regulatory scheme that satisfied certain federal requirements.  The Court 
noted that “Congress could constitutionally have enacted a statute 
prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal mining,” and held that the 
federal statute did not “become constitutionally suspect simply because 
Congress chose to allow the States a regulatory role.”  Id. at 290.  In the 
same way, § 1621 does no more than authorize the States to impose their 
own regulations, subject to certain conditions. 
As in Hodel, States can determine whether they wish to take 
advantage of the flexibility Congress provided, but must do so on the 
terms set out by Congress.  If the state legislature chooses to enact a law 
authorizing this Court to grant licenses to unlawfully present aliens, then 
federal immigration law would no longer impose a barrier to admission, 
and this Court could determine whether such licenses are appropriate.   
16 
 
In enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), Congress did not purport to strip this 
Court of authority that it would otherwise have enjoyed.  Absent § 1621(d), 
the State would have no authority to provide law licenses to unlawfully 
present aliens.  Section 1621(d) merely provides that, as a matter of federal 
law, the state legislature may override the federal default rule in the 
immigration area.  In Florida, for example, although the state constitution 
provides that the Florida Supreme Court has “exclusive jurisdiction to 
regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law,” Fla. Const. art. V, 
§ 15, the legislature overrode 8 U.S.C. § 1621 and thus granted its Court the 
discretion to admit unlawfully present aliens to the bar.  See Fla. Stat. 
§ 454.021(3); Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 134 So. 3d at 438-39 (Labarga, J., 
concurring) (noting that although authority over bar admissions is 
typically reserved to the Florida Supreme Court, under federal law only the 
legislature could establish an exception to 8 U.S.C. § 1621).   
As petitioners note, this Court ordinarily has exclusive authority to 
make determinations regarding eligibility for law licenses.  Utah Const. art 
VIII, § 4; Injured Workers Assoc. of Utah v. Utah, 374 P.3d 14, 20-21 (Utah 
2016).  But there is no dispute that 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) permissibly 
supersedes any authority this Court might have in the case of unlawfully 
17 
 
present aliens, and thus, absent 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), that unlawfully present 
aliens would be categorically ineligible for law licenses. 
The U.S. Supreme Court cases cited by the petition are inapposite.  In 
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), the Supreme Court upheld a federal 
statute authorizing the President to impose wage limitations on state 
employees.  The Court rejected the argument that limiting salary increases 
for state officials to 5.5%, when the state legislature had specifically 
provided for a 10.6% salary increase, impermissibly “interferes with 
sovereign state functions.”  Id. at 547.  To the extent that Fry is relevant, it 
merely underscores that the Tenth Amendment does not protect all 
operations within a State from federal intervention. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 
(1991), involved federal limitations on States’ ability to establish the 
qualifications of state judges.  The Court held that it would not conclude 
that Congress meant to legislate in this area absent a clear statement.  Id. at 
460-61.  Here, there is no dispute that Congress could have established a 
prohibition on the receipt of benefits without affording the States an 
opportunity to create a limited exception to the prohibition.  Congress’s 
accommodation of States’ interests in § 1621(d) cannot be said to “intrude 
18 
 
on state governmental functions,” id. at 470, or “alter the usual 
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,” id. 
at 460 (quotation marks omitted), and, of course, Congress has clearly 
indicated that enactment of a state law is required if a state intends to 
override the federal default rule.  The Appellate Division of the New York 
Supreme Court was thus wrong to treat 8 U.S.C. § 1621 as analogous to the 
provision at issue in Gregory.  See Matter of Vargas, 131 A.D.3d 4, 25-26 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2015). 
In sum, petitioners do not contest that federal law requires that the 
rule they seek take the form of an enactment by the State Legislature.  Their 
contention that this requirement violates the Tenth Amendment is without 
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ADDENDUM: 8 U.S.C. § 1621
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8 U.S.C. § 1621 
 
§ 1621. Aliens who are not qualified aliens or nonimmigrants ineligible 
for State and local public benefits 
(a) In general 
 Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in 
subsections (b) and (d), an alien who is not-- 
  (1) a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this title), 
 (2) a nonimmigrant under the Immigration and Nationality Act, or 
 (3) an alien who is paroled into the United States under section 
212(d)(5) of such Act for less than one year, 
is not eligible for any State or local public benefit (as defined in subsection 
(c)). 
(b) Exceptions 
 Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to the following State or 
local public benefits: 
 (1) Assistance for health care items and services that are necessary 
for the treatment of an emergency medical condition (as defined in 
section 1396b(v)(3) of Title 42) of the alien involved and are not related 
to an organ transplant procedure. 
  (2) Short-term, non-cash, in-kind emergency disaster relief. 
 (3) Public health assistance for immunizations with respect to 
immunizable diseases and for testing and treatment of symptoms of 
communicable diseases whether or not such symptoms are caused by a 
communicable disease. 
 (4) Programs, services, or assistance (such as soup kitchens, crisis 
counseling and intervention, and short-term shelter) specified by the 
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Attorney General, in the Attorney General's sole and unreviewable 
discretion after consultation with appropriate Federal agencies and 
departments, which (A) deliver in-kind services at the community level, 
including through public or private nonprofit agencies; (B) do not 
condition the provision of assistance, the amount of assistance 
provided, or the cost of assistance provided on the individual 
recipient's income or resources; and (C) are necessary for the protection 
of life or safety. 
(c) “State or local public benefit” defined 
 (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), for purposes of this 
subchapter the term “State or local public benefit” means-- 
 (A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial 
license provided by an agency of a State or local government or by 
appropriated funds of a State or local government; and 
 (B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted 
housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment 
benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance 
are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by 
an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a 
State or local government. 
 (2) Such term shall not apply-- 
 (A) to any contract, professional license, or commercial license for a 
nonimmigrant whose visa for entry is related to such employment in 
the United States, or to a citizen of a freely associated state, if section 
141 of the applicable compact of free association approved in Public 
Law 99-239 or 99-658 (or a successor provision) is in effect; 
 (B) with respect to benefits for an alien who as a work authorized 
nonimmigrant or as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act qualified for such benefits 
and for whom the United States under reciprocal treaty agreements is 
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required to pay benefits, as determined by the Secretary of State, after 
consultation with the Attorney General; or 
 (C) to the issuance of a professional license to, or the renewal of a 
professional license by, a foreign national not physically present in the 
United States. 
 (3) Such term does not include any Federal public benefit under section 
1611(c) of this title. 
(d) State authority to provide for eligibility of illegal aliens for State and 
local public benefits 
 A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the 
United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such 
alien would otherwise be ineligible under subsection (a) only through the 
enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively 
provides for such eligibility. 
